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ABSTRACT 
 
Antisemitism and anti-Zionism constitute two important ideological building blocks 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article is the first to present quantitative 
empirical survey data elucidating attitudes towards Jews and Israel among an 
opportunity sample of Iranians. This article examines the correlates of antisemitism 
and anti-Zionism in Iran with particular attention to the effects of identity, threat and 
political trust. Consistent with emerging research into antisemitism and anti-Zionism, 
there was a positive association between both forms of prejudice, suggesting social 
psychological overlap between the constructs. Given the pervasiveness of antisemitic 
and anti-Zionist representations in Iran, there were no significant differences in levels 
of anti-Zionism or antisemitism on the basis of gender and educational orientations. 
Political conservatives did manifest greater antisemitism and anti-Zionism than 
political reformists, although both groups scored highly on these scales. There was a 
significant interaction effect of Iranian national identity and political trust on anti-
Zionism, and a significant interaction effect of Muslim religious identity and political 
trust on antisemitism. Political trust was by far the most powerful predictor of both 
forms of prejudice, followed by the perception of identity threat. These observations 
are considered through the lenses of Social Identity Theory and Identity Process 
Theory from social psychology. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Antisemitism and anti-Zionism are often purported to constitute separate and 
delineable constructs. Antisemitism has been defined as “a persisting latent structure 
of hostile beliefs towards Jews” (Fein, 1987, p. 67), while anti-Zionism is 
conceptualized as the denigration and delegitimization of the State of Israel (for 
whatever reason) (Jaspal, 2014). Iran makes no secret of its fiercely anti-Zionist 
position, which became an official state policy following the Islamic Revolution in 
1979, but its leaders categorically deny that their regime is in any way antisemitic. In 
short, Iran officially makes a distinction between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, 
arguing that opposition to the existence of Israel does not amount to antisemitism 
(Shahvar, 2009), but it is difficult to know if this distinction is upheld in the Iranian 
general population. Iran vocally supports Palestinian sovereignty over the whole of 
present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and actively calls for the destruction of 
the Jewish State. This, many argue, reflects the anti-Zionist stance of the Iranian 
government, rather than antisemitism. Yet, Iranian leaders, including former president 
Ahmadinejad and the current Supreme Leader Khamenei, have made overtly 
antisemitic remarks, often blurring the boundaries between Jews and the State of 
Israel in their anti-Zionist diatribes (Shahvar, 2009). Moreover, former president 
Ahmadinejad’s blatant and repeated denial of the Holocaust exemplified the regime’s 
disdain not only for Israel but for the Jewish people as a whole (Jahanbegloo, 2007). 
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Thus, despite the Iranian regime’s keen delineation of the two forms of prejudice, it is 
likely that they are as inter-related in the minds of people as they are in the rhetoric of 
Iranian leaders. 
There is now a body of social sciences research into the development and 
deployment of anti-Zionism and antisemitism in Iran (Jaspal, 2013a; Litvak, 2006; 
Shahvar, 2009). Much research in this area tends to focus upon the political functions 
of this ideological stance (Küntzel, 2010; Takeyh, 2006) and its manifestation in 
social and political institutions in Iran, such as the newspaper media (Jaspal, 2014; 
Klein, 2009). There is only very limited empirical insight into attitudes towards Jews 
and Israel among the Iranian general population (though see Jaspal, 2014, for small-
scale qualitative interview research). This article is the first to present quantitative 
empirical survey data elucidating attitudes towards Jews and Israel among an 
opportunity sample of Iranians. This article examines the correlates of antisemitism 
and anti-Zionism in Iran with particular attention to the effects of identity, threat and 
political trust. 
 
Antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Iran 
Zionism can be described as an ethnonationalist ideology, whereby Israel is regarded 
as “the expression of the Jewish people’s right to national self-determination” (Beller, 
2007, p. 226).  However, the Iranian government views Zionism as a racist, 
oppressive Nazi ideology (Takeyh, 2006). Since Iran withdrew its recognition of the 
State of Israel, it has systematically referred to the Jewish State by demeaning terms, 
such as the “Zionist regime” and “Occupied Palestine,” which are intended to deprive 
Israel of state-like characteristics and thereby delegitimize it (Jaspal, 2013b). In 
addition to its active dissemination of delegitimizing social representations, Iran is a 
major funder of organizations committed to the destruction of Israel (Palmer-Harik, 
2004).  
Antisemitism has been repeatedly manifested at the institutional level in Iran, 
but it is also observable on a social level. As an Islamic Republic, Iran’s stance on 
Jews and Israel is deeply entwined with theological representations - Kressel’s (2012) 
groundbreaking book on Muslim antisemitism highlights some of the ways in which 
Islamic theological representations may be mobilized by Muslim antisemites in order 
to demonize Jews and Israel, and to instill in subsequent generations the necessity of 
targeting these outgroups. Moreover, Shahvar (2009) highlights the long-standing 
antisemitism of Shiite Islam (which is the dominant denomination of Islam in Iran) 
and the ways in which this has persisted in present-day Iran, particularly after the 
1979 Revolution. For instance, during the Qajar dynasty in Iran, Iranian Jews faced 
blood libel accusations, persecution, forced conversions – the forced conversion of 
Mashadi Jews to Islam in 1839 being an infamous case - and even pogroms (Levy, 
1999; Tsadik,  2005, 2010). Anti-Zionism and, arguably, antisemitism have become 
important ideological components of Iranian policy since 1979, which marked the fall 
of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran – a “golden age” for Iranian Jewry (Sanasarian, 2000). 
 Post-revolutionary Iran does not have a strong tradition of political parties. 
Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic Party ruled Iran until it 
was dissolved in 1987. There are now several political factions in Iran, such as the 
Moderation and Development Party, the Islamic Society of Engineers and the Front of 
Islamic Revolution Stability. Given that the social and political traction of these 
entities is limited (Asayesh et al., 2010), it is more appropriate to refer to them in 
terms of more ephemeral “factions”, rather than political parties. Iranian national 
politics is better understood as a dichotomy between “Conservatives” (Persian: 
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“osoolgaraa”) and “Reformists” (Persian: “eslahtalab”), which has greater resonance 
among Iranians. For instance, former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was formally 
a member of the Islamic Society of Engineers but he was popularly regarded as a 
conservative
1
 leader. Similarly, former president Mohammad Khatami, though a 
member of the Association of Combatant Clerics, was widely perceived as a political 
reformist. Indeed, the so-called Green Movement,
2
 which emerged in contestation of 
the re-election of Ahmadinejad in 2009, was a coalition of reformist and liberal 
political factions, in opposition to the conservatives. This served to further crystallize 
the conservative vs. reformist dichotomy, albeit with a broad conception of both 
political identities.  
In his overview of anti-Zionism in Iranian politics, Jaspal (2013a) has 
highlighted that the political reformists in Iran have generally sought a more 
pragmatic stance on relations with both the US and, in a much subtler manner, the 
State of Israel. However, following the election of conservative president 
Ahmadinejad, anti-Zionism (and, arguably, also antisemitism) was actively revived in 
Iranian domestic and foreign politics. Although anti-Zionism is now a particularly 
important tenet of the conservative political identity in Iran, it is unclear whether there 
are differences in attitudes towards Israel and Jews among conservative and reformist 
members of the Iranian general population. 
 
Empirical approaches to antisemitism and anti-Zionism 
As Kressel (2012) notes, there has been relatively little empirical social science 
research into antisemitism and anti-Zionism in the Islamic world. Much research has 
focused upon antisemitism in Europe and in Christianity. Previous work has been 
guided by approaches such as the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), obedience to authority (Milgram, 1963), 
scapegoating (Gregory, 2001), and, more recently, terror management theory (Cohen 
et al., 2009). No previous studies have examined the roles of identity and political 
trust in antisemitism and anti-Zionism. 
There have been several correlational survey-based studies, which seek to 
identify the individual traits that appear to be associated with antisemitism. Frindte, 
Wettig and Wammetsberger (2005) conducted two studies in Germany that examined 
antisemitism within the context of authoritarianism and social dominance. They 
showed that individuals who manifested extreme antisemitic attitudes differed 
significantly from those who scored low on antisemitism with regard to the extent of 
authoritarianism, readiness for violence, endorsement of National Socialism and 
political orientation. Moreover, they found that authoritarianism was an important 
predictor of antisemitism. In a unique cross-cultural examination of the social 
psychological predictors of antisemitism, Dunbar and Simonova (2003) found that the 
                                                        
1
 Ahmadinejad described himself as “osoolgaraa”, which literally means “principalist” or 
“fundamentalist”, although in Persian it does not have the same negative connotations that 
“fundamentalist” has in English. The term “osoolgaraa” can plausibly be defined as “conservative” in 
that it denotes a conservation of the original, fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as 
outlined in Ayatollah Khomeini’s (1979) Velayat-e Faqih (English Guardianship of Islamic Jurists). 
2
 The Green Movement is a largely amorphous superordinate political movement, consisting of various 
reformist and liberal factions with essentially different specific political goals (Dabashi, 2011). 
Reformists in the Green Movement like Mohammad Khatami (the former president) and Mir Hossein 
Mousavi (one of the 2009 presidential candidates) express allegiance to the principle of clerical 
guardianship as defined in Khomeini’s conception of the Islamic Republic, while many of the 
participants in the Green protests sought greater reform of the political system in Iran through the 
dismantlement of Islamic theocracy. 
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relationship between the right-wing extremism personality and antisemitism was 
positive and that the degree of antisemitic attitudes was similar in both the US and 
Czech samples, despite the distinct history of intergroup relations between these 
groups and Jews. These studies highlight the importance of personality traits vis-à-vis 
social and environmental factors. 
Several studies have also evidenced the link between particular demographic 
characteristics and antisemitism. It has been found that male respondents generally 
manifest greater antisemitism than female respondents (D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 
1991), that unskilled workers are more antisemitic than professionals (Selznick & 
Steinberg, 1969), that education is negatively correlated with antisemitism (Quinley 
& Glock, 1979), that younger people are generally less antisemitic than older people 
(Raab, 1983), and that the higher the concentration of Jews in one’s environment, the 
higher one’s level of antisemitism will be (Smith, 1991). While these studies provide 
important snapshots of antisemitism in particular temporal, cultural and geographical 
contexts (admittedly, largely in the US), they do not further our understanding of how 
antisemitism and anti-Zionism function in the Iranian general population or how they 
are related to one another.  
Furthermore, Weil (1985) examined the effects of education on liberalising 
attitudes in order to decipher the outcomes for antisemitism. In his cross-cultural 
research, he found that, while education was positively correlated with liberal 
attitudes towards Jews in the US and the West, the effect of education on liberal 
attitudes appeared to be weaker or even reversed in non-liberal democracies or 
countries with a history of authoritarian government. However, in the context of Iran, 
where anti-Zionism is a state policy and antisemitism is at least passively endorsed by 
governmental institutions, it is likely that personality traits and key demographic 
variables, such as level of education, will provide only partial explanations for the 
endorsement and manifestation of these forms of prejudice. Antisemitic and anti-
Zionist representations appear to be more coercive than in some of the contexts that 
have hitherto been studied and, thus, it is likely that these forms of prejudice will cut 
across such demographic divisions. 
 Several scholars argue that anti-Zionism amounts to antisemitism (Chesler, 
2003; Fischel, 2005). This argument generally focuses upon the notion that 
antisemitism is causally related to anti-Zionism. A number of empirical studies have 
distinguished between antisemitism and anti-Zionism variables, which are 
operationalized differently. In a survey study, Kaplan and Small (2006) found that 
that the prevalence of antisemitic views significantly increased with participants’ 
degree of anti-Zionist sentiment, even after controlling for other factors. Similarly, in 
their experimental research into mortality salience and attitudes towards Jews and 
Israel, Cohen et al. (2009) reasoned that, because modern sensibilities discourage 
people from manifesting overt prejudice such as classic antisemitism, individuals 
would be more likely to channel their prejudice via a more socially acceptable route, 
namely anti-Zionism. They argued that there is likely to be a bi-directional causality 
between antisemitism and anti-Zionism – antisemites are more likely to express anti-
Zionism, while anti-Zionism can also accentuate antisemitism. Frindte et al. (2005) 
argue that “criticism of Israel and anti-Zionism could represent special forms of 
substituted communication of anti-Semitic attitudes and, thus, could be described as 
modern forms or derivations of anti-Semitism” (p. 245). In a survey study 
antisemitism among Arab and non-Arab Muslims, Baum and Nakazawa (2007) found 
that antisemitism and anti-Zionism were moderately correlated and that the main 
effect of religion on anti-Zionism was significant.  
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Consistent with these studies that have focused largely upon Western, 
industrialized societies, the present study of attitudes among Iranians treats 
antisemitism and anti-Zionism as two distinct variables and examines the relationship 
between them. Although the two forms of prejudice are in fact highly inter-related in 
the rhetoric and positions of the Iranian political leadership, it is unclear how they are 
related in the minds of Iranians. 
 
Social identity and political trust 
In addition to personality traits, social identities are important predictors of prejudice 
(Brown, 2000; Tajfel, 1982). In developing Social Identity Theory, Tajfel (1982) 
argued that in most human interactions individuals’ group memberships are salient 
and can override their personal, individualizing traits. According to the theory, human 
beings are motivated psychologically to identify with social groups because they 
provide feelings of belonging, self-esteem and distinctiveness. Crucially, by viewing 
oneself primarily in terms of one’s membership in relevant social groups, one begins 
to think and act primarily as a member of that group (Turner et al., 1987). The 
stereotypes, myths, beliefs and social representations associated with, and generally 
accepted by, that group will become active and salient in the group member’s 
meaning-making. 
Religion is a social identity that has been associated with antisemitism. For 
instance, in their study of Christian antisemitism in the Netherlands, Konig et al. 
(2000) highlighted that Christian religion was a determinant of both religious and 
secular forms of antisemitism, which in turn exhibited the importance of religious 
imagery in contemporary secular thinking vis-à-vis Jews. It has been observed that in 
Iran Islamic theology is often invoked to construct Jews as inferior and “impure” and 
to justify antisemitism and anti-Zionism (Shahvar, 2009). In a unique and insightful 
survey study of antisemitism among both Christians and Muslims in North America, 
Baum (2009) found that, while personal identity was the strongest predictor of 
antisemitism among Christians (i.e. the perception that one has personally been 
mistreated by Jews), social identity was the strongest predictor among Muslim 
respondents (i.e. the perception that one’s Muslim ingroup was threatened by Jews). 
Consistent with the notion of social identity as a predictor of prejudice but in the 
context of national identity, Jaspal (2014) found that anti-Zionism was viewed as 
central to Iranian national identity and that young Iranians accentuated their anti-
Zionist stance as a means of asserting this identity. In short, individuals may come to 
believe that antisemitism and anti-Zionism are essential tenets of their social identities 
and that any acceptance of Jews or Israel would be inconsistent with their group 
membership. Given that social identities are socially constructed (Tajfel, 1982), this is 
likely to be dependent on the sorts of messages and representations disseminated at 
social and institutional levels which are subsequently internalized by individuals. 
Anti-Zionism is a central tenet of the political ideology of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and many people do derive their knowledge of Israel and Jews from 
political representations (Litvak, 2006). Thus, it is likely that political trust is an 
important factor in individuals’ perceptions of Jews and Israel. As Miller and 
Listhaug (1990, p. 358) highlights, 
 
[t]rust [..] reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are 
performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public. Citizen expectations 
of how government should operate include, among other criteria, that it be fair, equitable, 
honest, efficient, and responsive to society’s needs. In brief, an expression of trust in 
government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary judgment that the 
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system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant citizens’ scrutiny. 
 
History is replete with examples of widespread antisemitism (and, more recently, anti-
Zionism) having ensued from people’s trust in their political institutions. Many 
citizens of Nazi Germany came to view the Jews as a genuine threat to the continuity 
of the German nation because they trusted the Nazi government that disseminated 
threat representations (Herf, 2006). The deadly pogroms in Russia ensued from 
widespread belief in the anti-Jewish propaganda generated by the tsarist government 
in Russia (Klier & Lambroza, 1992). Iranians are habitually and systematically taught 
by governmental institutions (such as the education system) that Israel is the “Little 
Satan” which must be destroyed and, accordingly, “Death to Israel” is frequently 
heard in political gatherings in Iran (Kressel, 2009; Shahvar, 2009). It is likely that 
those citizens of Iran who trust their government, which is known to disseminate 
deeply anti-Zionist propaganda, punctuated by blatant antisemitism, will be less 
critical of antisemitic and anti-Zionist representations and, thus, more readily accept 
and assimilate them to their own thinking.  
In theorizing the likelihood of assimilating antisemitic and anti-Zionist 
representations, it is useful to draw upon Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986; 
Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). According to the theory, identity threat occurs when the 
individual believes that their sense of continuity, self-esteem, self-efficacy and 
distinctiveness are somehow jeopardized. Identity threat places the individual in a 
vulnerable position, forcing them to deploy “coping strategies” to deflect the threat. It 
has been argued that forms of prejudice, such as Islamophobia and antisemitism, may 
be associated with attempts to protect the self from identity threat (Jaspal, 2013a; 
Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). This is most likely to be applicable to groups that are 
positioned as the ingroup’s “Significant Others,” that is, outgroups that “threaten (or 
are perceived to threaten) its presumed ethnic or cultural purity and/or its 
independence” (Triandafyllidou, 2002, p. 33). Thus, individuals who are placed in a 
threatening position (for instance, as a result of the government’s attempts to 
construct their relevant identities as being jeopardized by an outgroup) may be more 
susceptible to expressing antisemitism and anti-Zionism. 
 
Hypotheses 
A series of hypotheses can be extrapolated on the basis of this brief review of relevant 
theory and research in this area. 
 
H1: Consistent with emerging research into antisemitism and anti-Zionism (Baum and 
Nakazawa, 2006; Kaplan & Small, 2005), there will be a positive association between 
these forms of prejudice. 
 
H2: In view of the coerciveness and “stickiness” of negative social representations of 
Israel and Jews in Iran, there will be no significant differences in levels of 
antisemitism or anti-Zionism on the basis of gender and educational orientations. 
However, political conservatives are expected to manifest greater antisemitism and 
anti-Zionism than reformists. 
 
H3: Because the Iranian government emphasizes its disdain for Israel, which it 
constructs as its “Significant Other”, both conservatives and reformists should 
manifest greater anti-Zionism than antisemitism. However, the perception of Jews as 
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“the enemy within” should render them more threatening than the State of Israel for 
Iranians of both political orientations. 
 
H4: Given the constructed centrality of anti-Zionism to Iranian national identity and 
its association with the political regime (Jaspal, 2013a), there will be a significant 
interaction effect of Iranian national identity and political trust on anti-Zionism. 
Similarly, because antisemitism is socially represented as central to an “authentic” 
Islamic identity (Baum & Nakazawa, 2006) and because of Islam’s centrality to the 
political regime, there will be a significant interaction effect of Muslim religious 
identity and political trust on antisemitism. 
 
H5: Recent research in the domain of Identity Process Theory suggests that outgroup 
discrimination may constitute a response to threatened identity (Cinnirella, 2014; 
Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the perception of 
identity threat will be positively associated with both anti-Zionism and antisemitism, 
respectively. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
This study is based on an opportunity sample of 130 participants. 163 individuals 
were originally recruited for the study but 33 participants were removed due to 
missing data on key measures such as antisemitism and anti-Zionism. In a challenging 
social and political context such as the Iranian one, research into highly sensitive and 
politicized topics such as antisemitism and anti-Zionism is difficult. It may be 
impossible to gain access to a representative sample, given that the researcher runs the 
risk of rousing suspicion about their (political) aims in conducting such research. 
Foreigners conducting research in Iran have been accused of espionage in the past.
3
 
Convenience sampling, though not ideal, was deemed to be the most appropriate 
method of recruitment in view of the sensitivities surrounding the research. However, 
attempts were made to limit the resulting sampling bias by recruiting participants in 
three distinct areas of Tehran (with differing socio-economic statuses) and in online 
settings. 
An Iranian research assistant assisted with data collection in Iran. Although a 
total of 107 were approached, 68 individuals (44% of the overall sample) were 
successfully recruited at three cafeterias in Elahieh (an affluent area in the North of 
Tehran), Ekbatan (a lower middle class area in the West of Tehran), and Javadiyeh 
(an economically deprived area in the South of Tehran). 39 individuals refused to 
complete the survey without reading the information sheet. Permission was obtained 
from the cafeteria staff to distribute questionnaires, but only the debrief sheet fully 
disclosed the true aims of the study. All of the respondents who read the information 
sheet did complete the survey, which may suggest a general willingness among 
Iranians to express social and political views despite the political pressure for them to 
conceal views that are inconsistent with the Iranian regime. None of the respondents 
withdrew their data after reading the debrief sheet. After a while, it was deemed 
unsafe for the researcher to continue collecting data in these settings due to potential 
repercussions from the Iranian authorities. For instance, in one of the three cafeterias 
                                                        
3
 Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/07/uk-iran-rouhani-idUKKCN0HW1PE20141007 
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the researcher was asked on three occasions if the research was funded by “Zionists”, 
which suggested some suspicion surrounding research into attitudes towards Jews and 
Israel. In addition, 95 individuals (56% of the overall sample) completed the 
questionnaire online. An online version of the questionnaire was created and the link 
was posted on various social networking websites (e.g. Iranian.com; and Iranian 
political and cultural pages on Facebook and Twitter) frequented by Iranian Internet 
users.  
The aim was to recruit a fairly heterogeneous sample of Iranians. Most of the 
participants were men (N=94, 72% of the sample) and just over a quarter were women 
(N=36, 28% of the sample). Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 66 years - the mean 
age of participants was 27.8 years (SD = 8.1). The distribution of educational 
background was fairly equal, including those educated to high school level (N=38, 
29% of the sample), to diploma level (N=49, 38%) and to university level (N=43, 
33%). The majority of participants were born in Tehran (N=85, 65.4% of the sample), 
with sizeable numbers from Shiraz (N = 25, 19.2%) and Esfahan (N=11, 8.5%). Most 
participants defined their ethnicity as Persian (N=105, 81% of the sample) and the 
remainder as Balochi (N=18, 14%) or Azeri Turk (N=7, 5%). There was a fairly even 
distribution of political orientation – 60 participants defined themselves as 
“conservatives” (46% of the sample) and 70 as “reformists” (54%).4 
 
Instruments 
Iranian National Identity 
Iranian national identity was assessed using an adapted version of Cinnirella’s (1997) 
British national identity scale, which is based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 
1982). The word “British” was substituted with the word “Iranian”. The scale consists 
of items that measure correlated aspects of social identity, such as affect (“To what 
extent do you feel pleased to be Iranian?”), salience (“To what extent do you feel 
Iranian”) and centrality (“How important to you is being Iranian?” Each item was 
scored on an 8-point Likert scale and a mean score of the seven items was calculated 
in order to produce a single overall Iranian national identity composite score. A 
higher score indicates a stronger national identity. Consistent with previous studies, 
the scale manifested a good internal reliability: α = .85. 
 
Muslim Religious Identity 
Given our interest in Muslim religious identity as a social identity, in parallel with our 
conceptualization of Iranian national identity as a social identity, Cinnirella’s (1997) 
scale was adapted to measure Muslim religious identity. The word “British” was 
substituted with the word “Muslim”. In order to capture the institutional nature of 
religious identity, an extra item was added to the scale: “To what extent do you 
participate in activities and events associated with Muslims?” No distinction was 
made between Sunni and Shiite subgroup identities, since the vast majority of Iranians 
are Shiite and differences between Sunnis and Shiites were not expected. Each item 
was scored on an 8-point Likert scale and a mean score of the eight items was 
calculated in order to produce a single overall Muslim religious identity composite 
score. A higher score indicates a stronger religious identity. The scale manifested an 
excellent internal reliability: α = .95. 
 
                                                        
4
 In the questionnaire, the Persian terms “osoolgaraa” and “eslahtalab” were used to refer to 
“conservative” and “reformist”, respectively. 
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Antisemitism 
Participants’ level of antisemitism was measured using an adapted version of 
Todosijevic and Enyedi’s (2002) Antisemitism Scale (see appendix 1) The scale 
included items that tapped into participants’ evaluation of Jews5 (e.g. “It’s better to 
have nothing to do with Jews”) and their endorsement of long-standing anti-Jewish 
stereotypes (e.g. “There is a secret Jewish conspiracy”). Some items were re-worded 
in order to fit within the Iranian context and items deemed to be irrelevant to the 
Iranian context were removed. A new item that tapped into Holocaust denial, which is 
an important component of Iranian antisemitism (Jahanbegloo, 2007), was added to 
the scale: “The Holocaust is often exaggerated by Jews.” Each item was scored on an 
8-point Likert scale and a mean score of the items was calculated in order to produce 
a single overall antisemitism composite score. A higher score indicates a higher level 
of antisemitism. The internal reliability of the scale was excellent, α = .89. 
 
Anti-Zionism 
Anti-Zionism was measured using an adapted version of the Attitudes Towards Israel 
Scale (Cohen et al., 2009) (see appendix 2). The scale assesses individuals’ levels of 
pro-Israeli sentiment (e.g. I strongly support the Israeli cause) and of their 
endorsement of attacks against Israel
6
 (e.g. “Palestinian attacks on Israel are justified). 
Moreover, additional items were created and included in the scale in order to measure 
the level of perceived threat associated with Israel, such as: “Israel threatens Iran’s 
competence and control in the world.” This was deemed necessary given the history 
of problematic intergroup relations between Iran and Israel (Takeyh, 2006). As can be 
seen in the appendices, the antisemitism and anti-Zionism scales were sufficiently 
different so as to capture each form of prejudice. The two scales have been 
successfully employed in previous research. Each item was scored on an 8-point 
Likert scale and a mean score of the items was calculated in order to produce a single 
overall anti-Zionism composite score. A higher score indicates a higher level of anti-
Zionism. The internal reliability of the scale was good, α =.8. 
 
Political Trust 
Participants’ level of political trust was measured using both the Trust in Politicians 
and the Trust in the Political System scales (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). The Trust in 
Politicians scale includes items, such as “Politicians generally have good intentions,” 
in order to measure the level of trust in politicians, and the Trust in the Political 
System scale includes items, such as “At present I feel very critical of our political 
system,” in order to measure the level of trust people have in the political system. The 
items were slightly re-worded in order to be applicable to the Iranian context – for 
instance, the word “US” was substituted by the word “Iranian.” Each item was scored 
on an 8-point Likert scale and a mean score of the items was calculated in order to 
produce a single overall political trust composite score. A higher score indicates a 
higher level of political trust. The internal reliability of the scale was excellent, α = 
.92. 
 
 
                                                        
5
 The term “yahudian” (literally “Jews”) was used to refer to Jews. While the singular noun “yahud” 
has negative connotations in Persian, the plural term “yahudian” does not. It is also much more 
commonly used than the alternative term “kalimi” (a more literary term for Jews). 
6
 The Persian term “esrail” was used to refer to the State of Israel. In political rhetoric, the term “regim-
e seihonisti” (literally “Zionist Regime”) is often used but has negative, delegitimizing connotations.  
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Identity Threat Measure 
A new scale was developed to measure participants’ level of identity threat, as 
defined in Identity Process Theory (see apprendix 3). The scale consisted of seven 
items, each of which tapped into participants’ perceived level of each principle. The 
scale included items such as “I feel unique and distinctive” (distinctiveness) and “I 
feel that I have competence and control in my life” (self-efficacy). Each item was 
scored on an 8-point Likert scale and a mean score of the items was calculated in 
order to produce a single overall identity threat composite score. Theoretically, it is 
possible, and even likely, for individuals to perceive high levels of one principle but 
low levels of another and, thus, it was not anticipated that all of the items would be 
highly correlated. However, the overall score would provide a general sense of 
perceived identity threat among participants. The internal reliability of the scale was 
acceptable, α = .74. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 below shows the mean scores on each of the main variables. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Correlations 
Although Iran is an Islamic theocracy and the country is officially defined as an 
Islamic Republic, there was in fact no significant correlation between Iranian national 
identity and Muslim religious identity, r = -.04, p>0.05, suggesting that it was 
possible to be highly identified with the nation without identifying with the Islamic 
religion. Both Iranian national identity and Muslim religious identity were strongly 
associated with political trust, r = .42, p<.005 and r = .75, p<.005 respectively, 
suggesting that these identities may be shaped by the messages and representations 
disseminated by the government. In partial support of hypothesis 4, Iranian national 
identity was correlated with anti-Zionism, r = .58, p<.005, but not with antisemitism, 
r = .12, p>.05. Conversely, Muslim religious identity was strongly associated with 
both antisemitism and anti-Zionism, r = .77, p<.005 and r = .52, p<.005 respectively, 
indicating that both anti-Zionism and antisemitism may be regarded as tenets of this 
identity. In partial support of hypothesis 4, political trust was strongly associated with 
both antisemitism and anti-Zionism, r = .84, p<.005 and .84, p<.005 respectively. In 
support of hypothesis 1, antisemitism and anti-Zionism were correlated, r = .62, 
p<.005, suggesting that the two forms of prejudice were associated in the minds of 
participants. Furthermore, in support of hypothesis 2, identity threat was strongly 
associated with antisemitism, r = .83, p<.005, and moderately associated with anti-
Zionism, r = .58, p<.005, suggesting that individuals with a threatened sense of self 
may particularly susceptible to these forms of prejudice. 
 
Differences between gender, education and political orientation groups 
Male and female participants were compared on their levels of antisemitism and anti-
Zionism, respectively. The mean score of anti-Zionism among male participants was 
5.99 (SD = 1.31) and the mean score for female participants was 5.24 (SD = 1.2). The 
gender difference was found to be statistically non-significant using an independent-
samples t-test, t(128) = 2.97, p>.005, which supported hypothesis 2. The mean score 
for antisemitism among male participants was 5.29 (SD = 1.46) and the mean score 
among female participants was 5.48 (SD = 1.35). In support of hypothesis 2, the 
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difference was found to be statistically non-significant using an independent samples 
t-test, t(128) = 0.41, p>0.05, indicating that there was no statistically significant 
difference between the levels of antisemitism manifested by male and female 
participants, respectively. 
 Participants were compared in terms of their level of education. The mean 
score of anti-Zionism among participants educated to high school level was 5.71 (SD 
= 1.07), among those educated to diploma level it was 5.82 (SD = 1.47), and among 
those educated to university level it was 5.8 (SD = 1.37). A one-way ANOVA was 
used to test for differences in levels of anti-Zionism among the three groups, which 
revealed no significant differences between the three groups, F (2, 127) = 0.82, 
p>0.05. This provided partial support of hypothesis 2. The mean score for 
antisemitism among participants educated to high school level was 5.58 (SD = 1.43), 
among those educated to diploma level it was 5.38 (SD = 1.46), and among those 
educated to university level it was 5.08 (SD = 1.36). A one-way ANOVA was used to 
test for differences in levels of antisemitism among the three groups, which revealed 
no significant differences between them, F (2, 127) = 1.29, p>0.05, providing support 
for hypothesis 2. In short, there was no evidence that participants differed in their 
levels of antisemitism and anti-Zionism in accordance with their level of education. 
 Participants were also compared in terms of their political orientation. The 
mean score of anti-Zionism among those identified with political conservatives was 
6.65 (SE = .1) and that of those identified with the political reformists was 5.04 (SE = 
.15). Although both scores were high (above the mid-point of the Likert scale), the 
difference was found to be statistically significant using an independent-samples t-
test, t(128) = 8.8, p<.001, indicating that political conservatives manifested 
significant higher levels of anti-Zionism than political reformists. The mean score for 
antisemitism among political conservatives was 6.31 (SE = .09) and that among 
political reformists was 4.52 (SE = .16). The difference was found to be statistically 
significant using an independent-samples t-test, t(128) = 9.16, p<.001, indicating that 
political conservatives manifested significant higher levels of antisemitism than 
political reformists. In short, although both conservatives and reformists manifest 
rather high levels of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, the conservatives tended to score 
more highly on these scales. This provides partial support for hypothesis 2. 
Given that there was an observable difference in scores of antisemitism and 
anti-Zionism among the two political orientation groups, antisemitism and anti-
Zionism scores were compared within each group, that is, among the conservatives 
and reformists, respectively. On average, conservative participants manifested 
significantly greater anti-Zionism (M = 6.65, SE = .09) than antisemitism (M = 5.31, 
SE = .09, t(59) = 2.3, p < .05), and the same difference was observable among 
reformists who also manifested greater anti-Zionism (M = 5.04, SE = .15) than 
antisemitism (M = 4.52, SE = .16, t(69) = 3.54, p < .001). In all four cases, however, 
scores were above the mid-point on the Likert scale and, thus, high. However, 
conservatives perceived Jews as posing a greater threat to Iran (M = 6.57, SE = .14) 
than the State of Israel (M = 5.95, SE = .27, t(59)= -2.05, p < .05), and the same 
difference was observable among reformists who also perceived Jews as posing a 
greater threat to Iran (M = 4.39, SE = .28) than the State of Israel (M = 3.5, SE = .26, 
t(69) = 2.80, p < .01). Interestingly, among the reformists, the perceived threat of 
Israel was below the mid-point of the Likert scale and, thus, low. 
  
 
 
 13 
Interactions between social identities and political trust 
A median split was performed on the independent variables of Iranian national 
identification and political trust, respectively, in order to split the sample into “high” 
versus “low.” A two-way ANOVA indicated significant main effects of level of 
Iranian national identification (F(1, 126) = 90.84, p < 0.001) and level of political 
trust (F(1, 126) = 52.17, p < 0.001) on anti-Zionism. In addition, a significant level of 
Iranian national identification X level of political trust interaction was found (F(1, 
126) = 41.30, p < 0.001). As indicated in figure 1 and in support of hypothesis 4, this 
interaction demonstrates that political trust does appear to have an effect for low 
identifiers with the Iranian national ingroup. Low national identifiers with high 
political trust appear to score significantly higher on anti-Zionism than low national 
identifiers with low political trust. 
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
 
Similarly, a median split was performed on the independent variables of Muslim 
religious identification and political trust, respectively, in order to split the sample 
into “high” versus “low.” Another two-way ANOVA was conducted to ascertain any 
potential interaction of level of Muslim religious identification and level of political 
trust. There was a significant main effect of level of Muslim religious identification 
(F(1, 126) = 27.58, p < 0.001) and no significant effect of level of political trust (F(1, 
126) = 2.21, p > 0.05) on level of antisemitism. However, a significant level of 
Muslim religious identification X level of political trust interaction was found (F(1, 
126) = 4.67, p < 0.05). As indicated in figure 2 and in partial support of hypothesis 4, 
this interaction demonstrates that political trust does appear to have an effect for low 
identifiers with the Islamic religion. Low religious identifiers with high political trust 
appear to score significantly higher on antisemitism than low religious identifiers with 
low political trust. 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 
Multiple regression analyses 
Predictors of antisemitism 
In order to gain more in-depth insight into the relationships between the predictor 
variables and antisemitism, a series of 4 regression models were constructed and 
examined. Model 1 included the political orientation variable only. Model 2 included 
political orientation and level of political trust. Model 3 included political orientation; 
political trust and Muslim identification. Model 4 included political orientation; 
political trust; Muslim identification; and identity threat as predictor variables. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Model 1, which included political orientation only, explained a statistically significant 
proportion of the variance in the antisemitism measure among respondents (R
2
 = .39, 
F(1,129)=83.46, p < .001). Model 2, which incrementally included level of political 
trust, yielded a substantial increase in the explanatory power (R
2
 = .71, F(2, 129) = 
151.89, p < .001), accounting for almost a quarter of the variance in the antisemitism 
score. In this model, political orientation was no longer a statistically significant 
predictor, but political trust was strongly associated with antisemitism. In model 3, 
which included Muslim identification alongside the aforementioned variables, the R
2
 
 14 
was raised to .75 (DR
2
=0.04, F(2, 129) = 128.56, p < .001), accounting for just over 
three-quarters of the variance in the antisemitism score. Both political trust and 
Muslim identification remained strongly associated with antisemitism. In model 4, 
which included identity threat alongside the aforementioned variables, the R
2
 was 
raised to .76 (DR
2
=0.01, F(5, 129) = 81.98, p < .001). All of the variables, apart from 
political orientation, remained statistically significant predictors of antisemitism. 
Identity threat was also significantly associated with antisemitism. 
 
Predictors of anti-Zionism 
In order to gain more in-depth insight into the relationships between the predictor 
variables and anti-Zionism, a further set of multiple regression models were 
constructed and examined. Model 1 included the political orientation variable only. 
Model 2 included political orientation and level of political trust. Model 3 included 
political orientation; political trust and Iranian national identification. Model 4 
included political orientation; political trust; Muslim identification; and identity 
threat. 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Model 1, which included political orientation only, explained a statistically significant 
proportion of the variance in the anti-Zionism measure among respondents (R
2
 = .38, 
F(1,129)=77.42, p < .001). Model 2, which incrementally included level of political 
trust, yielded a substantial increase in the explanatory power (R
2
 = .71, F(2, 129) = 
157.27, p < .001), accounting for almost a quarter of the variance in the anti-Zionism 
score. In this model, political orientation was no longer a statistically significant 
predictor, but political trust was strongly associated with anti-Zionism. In model 3, 
which included Iranian national identification alongside the aforementioned variables, 
the R
2
 was raised to .77 (DR
2
=.06, F(3, 129) = 143.56, p < .001), accounting for over 
three-quarters of the variance in the anti-Zionism score. Both political trust and 
Iranian national identification remained strongly associated with anti-Zionism. In 
model 4, which included identity threat alongside the aforementioned variables, the 
R
2
 was raised to .79 (DR
2
=.02, F(4, 129) = 116.04, p < .001). All of the variables, 
apart from political orientation, remained statistically significant predictors of anti-
Zionism. Identity threat was also significantly associated with anti-Zionism. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this exploratory study provide preliminary insight into the correlates of 
antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Iran and, thus, complement the qualitative studies 
that have preceded it (e.g. Jaspal, 2013a, 2014). It is noteworthy that, despite the use 
of two distinct scales to tap into antisemitism and anti-Zionism, respectively, these 
forms of prejudice are correlated, which suggests that they are entwined and 
inseparable in the minds of some individuals. Indeed, it has been observed that in Iran 
there is much slippage between the categories “Israeli” and “Jew” which renders them 
difficult to delineate. This possibly reflects a bi-dimensional relationship between 
antisemitism and anti-Zionism (Cohen et al., 2009; Frindte et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
the multiple regression models for antisemitism and anti-Zionism suggested that the 
same social psychological mechanisms (with the same order of importance) underlie 
the two forms of prejudice. Israel and Jews seem to be viewed in a similar light - 
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qualitative research among Iranians suggests that Jews are often held responsible for 
the actions of the State of Israel (Jaspal, 2014).  
Although both reformist and conservative participants manifested significantly 
higher levels of anti-Zionism than antisemitism, which is consistent with the Iranian 
government’s aim to construct Israel as Iran’s “Significant Other” in the region 
(Triandafyllidou, 2002), individuals of both political orientations perceived Jews as 
posing a greater threat than the State of Israel. This clear example of antisemitism 
may constitute a by-product of Iran’s anti-Zionist policy. More specifically, this may 
be attributed to the notion that Jews are viewed as a threatening “enemy within” 
(Bartov, 1998). In qualitative research, Iranians have indicated that they perceive 
Iranian Jews as disloyal to the Iranian national ingroup because of a supposed 
underlying loyalty to the State of Israel – they are often perceived as functioning as 
“agents” of Israel (Shahvar, 2009). Thus, despite the adamant assertions of the Iranian 
political establishment that the Islamic Republic is anti-Zionist and not antisemitic, 
these data suggest that, for our sample at least, the two forms of prejudice are less 
delineable (see also Cohen et al., 2009). 
 In support of hypothesis 2, there were no significant differences in 
antisemitism or anti-Zionism among participants in accordance with level of 
education or gender. Although much research into antisemitism has indeed found 
such differences in the US and Europe (e.g. D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1991; Quinley 
& Glock, 1979; Selznick & Steinberg, 1969), it appears that social representations of 
Israel and Jews are more coercive and hegemonic in the Iranian context and, thus, 
more pervasive across distinct social groups. Iranians are socialized in a context in 
which anti-Zionism is normative and antisemitism is at least passively endorsed 
(Jaspal, 2014). As highlighted in the results, there is a strong perception of threat to 
Iranian national identity from Israel and, in some cases, to Muslim religious identity 
from Jews. However, as predicted, political conservatives did manifest significantly 
higher levels of antisemitism and anti-Zionism than political reformists. This may be 
attributed to the constructed centrality of anti-Zionism to the conservative political 
agenda and the general desire among conservatives to remain faithful to the original 
tenets of the Iranian revolutionary ideology (Jaspal, 2013a). After the election of 
former conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there was a reversal of some 
of the more liberal policies introduced by his reformist predecessor Mohammad 
Khatami. One such policy was a more pragmatic approach to the State of Israel. 
Although during the presidency of the reformist Mohammad Khatami Iran became a 
refuge for Holocaust deniers such as Wolfgang Fröhlich, Holocaust denial has 
become particularly associated with political conservatism in Iran. This became 
particularly important during Ahmadinejad’s presidency during which he hosted the 
International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust in 2006 
(Jahanbegloo, 2007). Thus, both antisemitism and anti-Zionism have been more 
strongly associated with the conservative camp. However, even among reformists 
both forms of prejudice were still quite strongly manifested, which may be attributed 
to the prowess of these representations in Iran and their apparent acceptance at 
various levels of Iranian society. 
 Anti-Zionism is constructed as an important tenet of Iranian national identity, 
which is consistent with the revolutionary ideology that underpins contemporary 
Iranian nationhood (Takeyh, 2009). In support of hypothesis 4, there were significant 
main effects of Iranian national identity and political trust on anti-Zionism, as well as 
a significant interaction effect. More specifically, for low national identifiers, political 
trust had an important impact on anti-Zionism in that those who trusted the political 
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system were significantly more anti-Zionist. Because Israel is constructed as a threat 
to the Iranian national ingroup, it is unsurprising that those highly identified with the 
nation should respond defensively (Brown, 2000). However, for low national 
identifiers, it seems that trust in the political system, which may be for reasons other 
than nationhood (e.g. the centrality of religion), is associated with anti-Zionism. 
Moreover, the Iranian political establishment has consistently focused on demonizing 
the State of Israel and, thus, predictably, those who trust this political system are more 
likely to assimilate and accommodate its political messages, such as anti-Zionism. 
Similarly, various analysts have observed that, in some contexts, social 
representations of Muslim religious identity may indicate that it is legitimate and, in 
some cases, necessary to hate Jews (Baum & Nakazawa, 2007; Kressel, 2009). In 
further support of hypothesis 4, there were significant main effects of Muslim 
religious identity and political trust on antisemitism, as well as a significant 
interaction effect. This mirrored the aforementioned interaction effect of Iranian 
national identity and political trust on anti-Zionism. Partly as a result of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, which is often Islamicized as a conflict between Jews and 
Muslims (Litvak, 1998), and growing intergroup tensions in an atmosphere of global 
Islamophobia (Cinnirella, 2014), many Muslims may construe “Significant Others”, 
such as the Jewish outgroup, as posing a threat to the religious ingroup. Indeed, as 
outlined above, there was a stronger perception of threat from Jews than from the 
State of Israel. Thus, those who were highly identified with the Muslim religious 
ingroup manifested greater antisemitism.  
In accordance with Social Identity Theory (Brown, 2000; Tajfel, 1982) and 
Social Representations Theory (Moscovici, 1988) from social psychology, it is argued 
that those messages, ideas, myths and representations associated with salient group 
memberships will in turn acquire social and psychological salience (Breakwell, 2001). 
Accordingly, Iranians who valued their national and religious identities accepted and 
manifested the positions that they saw as being associated with these identities – 
namely anti-Zionism and antisemitism, respectively. However, social identity appears 
to provide only a partial explanation of these forms of prejudice. The multiple 
regression models indicated that Iranian national and Muslim religious identities were 
significant but the weakest predictors of anti-Zionism and antisemitism, respectively. 
There is evidence that the Iranian government has made, and continues to 
make, remarks that can legitimately be construed as antisemitic. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that individuals who trust the political system seem to assimilate and 
accommodate antisemitic messages associated with this political system. Similarly, 
the multiple regression models indicated that political trust was by far the strongest 
predictor of both forms of prejudice, although it made a stronger contribution to 
explaining anti-Zionism. This is understandable in view of the politicization of anti-
Zionism (Takeyh, 2006) and the government’s consistent dissemination of anti-
Zionist messages to Iranians, most of whom have no first-hand contact with Israel or 
Zionism. It is similarly understandable that political trust predicts antisemitism 
because the political system has rendered religion and religious intergroup relations 
salient by accentuating the distinctive Shiite religious character of Iran and its long-
standing enmity with Jews (Shahvar, 2009; Tsadik, 2010). In Iran, the government 
attempts to extend its influence to all spheres of social and religious life and its 
insistence on anti-Zionism, and to some degree antisemitism, has clearly had 
important repercussions for how people view Israel and Jews. However, it is 
noteworthy that the rhetoric of Israeli leaders and politicians that emphasizes the 
“Iranian threat” and that sometimes advocates pre-emptive military action against Iran 
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is also likely to feed into the perceived enmity of Israel and, in many cases, of the 
Jewish people (see Jaspal & Coyle, 2014; Klein, 2009). 
After political trust, the strongest predictor of both antisemitism and anti-
Zionism was the perception of identity threat. This provided support for hypothesis 5. 
It may be the case that individuals who generally perceive insufficient levels of 
continuity, self-esteem, self-efficacy and distinctiveness will attempt to cope with 
threat by manifesting prejudice against their “Significant Others” – there is little 
doubt that Israel and Jews are constructed as Iran’s Significant Others (Jaspal, 2013a; 
Shahvar, 2009). This follows a similar logic to Terror Management Theory, which 
suggests that individuals cope with death anxiety (or with threats to their continuity) 
by protecting their worldview. One important means of protecting one’s worldview is 
by derogating outgroups who hold a distinct and contradictory worldview. This has 
been discussed in relation to both antisemitism and anti-Zionism (Cohen et al., 2009). 
Similarly, it may be that individuals whose identities are threatened (for whatever 
reason) may attempt to restore appropriate levels of their identity principles by 
manifesting prejudice towards outgroups. By engaging in antisemitic and anti-Zionist 
prejudice, individuals may enhance self-esteem through downward comparison 
(Wills, 1981), continuity by maintaining the worldview perceived to be associated 
with relevant social identities, distinctiveness from a “Significant Other” and self-
efficacy by construing the outgroup as powerless. This finding is consistent with 
recent theorising in the field of Identity Process Theory (Cinnirella, 2014; Jaspal & 
Cinnirella, 2010), but it would certainly benefit from further research using alternative 
methods. 
 
Limitations 
This study presents several limitations, which ought to be addressed in future 
research. First, the study relies on a small opportunity sample of 130 Iranians largely 
in the Iranian capital city Tehran, rather than a representative sample. It would be 
useful to conduct similar studies outside of the capital city, where anti-Zionism and 
antisemitism may be less politicized. This may also elucidate potential ethnic 
differences in attitudes towards Jews and Israel given that Iran is an ethnically diverse 
country. Ideally, one could broaden the recruitment strategy by engaging in 
convenience sampling in more of the districts in Tehran. This was partially attempted 
in the present study through recruitment in three socio-economically distinct districts 
in the city, but this could of course be bolstered with more districts and a larger 
sample. While a representative sample would be desirable, this is difficult in Iran 
where social research of this kind may be regarded with suspicion. Conducting 
research of this kind in Iran makes the researcher susceptible to harsh social and legal 
repercussions, which must be taken into consideration. Given the fact that the data 
come from a convenience sample, it is important to exercise caution interpreting the 
analysis presented – these statistical patterns are reported in relation to the sample, not 
the population. However, it is interesting that the statistical patterns observed are 
clearly echoed in some of the qualitative research into antisemitism and anti-Zionism 
among Iranians (Jaspal, 2014). Moreover, it is noteworthy that 56% of the sample was 
recruited online, which may constitute one means of gaining access to a more 
representative sample of Iranians, although this will naturally be limited to those with 
access to the Internet. In short, the results of this study must be considered with this 
limitation in mind - the results are suggestive but by no means conclusive.  
Second, the correlational design of the study makes it impossible to make 
unequivocal statements about causality. This study elucidates the correlates of 
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antisemitism and anti-Zionism and it is hoped the future research will tap into the 
causal mechanisms of these forms of prejudice through the use of experimental 
methods, possibly in an online setting in order to curb the limitations of face-to-face 
participant recruitment in Iran. It would, for instance, be useful to gauge the potential 
importance of social identification in antisemitism and anti-Zionism by manipulating 
the salience of relevant group memberships as well as the representations associated 
with them. This would complement existing research in the Social Representations 
Theory tradition (Breakwell, 2001) and bolster the theoretical implications of this 
study (Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014). Moreover, while this cross-sectional study was 
intended to provide a snapshot of antisemitism and anti-Zionism at one particular 
point in time, future research ought to replicate the study by generating longitudinal 
data that can track changes in perceptions of Jews and Israel at distinct points in time. 
This would also provide insight into future convergences or divergences between 
antisemitism and anti-Zionism. 
Third, it would be useful to gauge attitudes towards other ethnic and religious 
outgroups, such as the Bahai people, who are also subject to discrimination in Iran 
(Sanasarian, 2000). This would provide insight into the “position” of Jews vis-à-vis 
other ethnic and religious outgroups. It is important to emphasize that Jews and 
Israelis are not the only outgroups at the receiving end of discrimination in the Iranian 
context, but these outgroups are deemed to be important ones to examine due to (i) 
the political climate surrounding Israeli-Iranian relations and (ii) the fact that there is 
a large Jewish minority still resident in Iran. Moreover, antisemitism and anti-Zionism 
could further exacerbate already problematic intergroup and international relations, 
feeding into the Israeli “siege mentality” that has been discussed by intergroup 
relations scholars (Bar-Tal, 2000). In future research, the impact of the Israeli “siege 
mentality”, which has been described in relation to the rhetoric of Israeli leaders (Bar-
Tal, 2000), on Iranian attitudes towards Jews and Israel – more specifically, does the 
perceived threat of an Israeli attack on Iran fan the flames of Iranian anti-Zionism and 
antisemitism? 
 Despite these limitations, the present study does provide some preliminary 
quantitative insight into antisemitism and anti-Zionism in Iran. These results may lack 
external validity, given that the sample is not representative, but the inclusion of 
distinct political orientations and other demographic groups in the sample provides 
scope for suggestive, though not conclusive, remarks about how antisemitism and 
anti-Zionism may function in the Iranian general population. In a country with a 
Jewish population of approximately 25,000-30,000 according to recent estimates 
(Sarshar, 2014; Yeroushalmi, 2013), the study of antisemitism and anti-Zionism is of 
critical importance. Iranian leaders habitually delegitimize the State of Israel and deny 
the Holocaust, yet claim that they are “only” anti-Zionist - the present study exposes 
the fallacy of this claim in even a small convenience sample.  
Although exploratory and preliminary in scope, this study demonstrates that 
attitudes towards Jews and Israel appear to be troublingly negative, even among the 
most educated sections of Iranian society and among the political “reformists” who 
are often thought to be in favor of social and political reform, and that trust in the 
Iranian political system and the content and strength of their national and religious 
identities seem to be closely associated with these forms of prejudice. The results also 
suggest a potential link between threatened identity and outgroup prejudice. Social 
and political discourses continue to threaten identity among the Iranian people, to 
construct antisemitism and anti-Zionism as central tenets of national and religious 
identities and, accordingly, to construct Israel and the Jewish people as legitimate 
 19 
targets for delegitimization and demonization, providing a convenient outgroup for 
protecting one’s own identity from threat. It is hoped that this article will draw further 
attention to the inter-related problems of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, in order to 
understand the social psychological mechanisms of these forms of prejudice in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and indeed elsewhere. 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
Table 1: Mean scores on the main variables 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Iranian national 
identity 
4.52 1.27 
Muslim religious 
identity 
5.15 1.9 
Political trust 4.71 1.56 
Antisemitism 5.34 1.43 
Anti-Zionism 5.78 1.32 
Identity threat
 
4.47 1.19 
N=130 
 
 
Figure 1: Two-way ANOVA interaction effects between Iranian national 
identification and political trust on anti-Zionism 
 
 
Figure 2: Two-way ANOVA interaction effects between Muslim religious 
identification and political trust on antisemitism 
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Table 1: Predictors of anti-Zionism.  
Standardized Regression Weights and R
2
 Values for Regression 
 
PREDICTORS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Political 
orientation 
.61* .02 .03 .07 
Political trust - .83* .71* .92* 
Iranian 
identification 
- - .27* 
 
.20* 
Identity threat - - - .25* 
     
MODEL R
2 .38 .71 .77 .79 
Note: Entries in bold with an asterisk are statistically significant (p<.05). Cells without entries indicate 
that this predictor was not used in the model. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Predictors of antisemitism.  
Standardized Regression Weights and R
2
 Values for Regression 
 
PREDICTORS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Political 
orientation 
.63* .05 -.09 -.08 
Political trust - .80* .63* .51* 
Muslim 
identification 
- - .37* 
 
.22* 
Identity threat - - - .27* 
     
MODEL R
2 .39 .71 .75 .76 
Note: Entries in bold with an asterisk are statistically significant (p<.05). Cells without entries indicate 
that this predictor was not used in the model. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Antisemitism Scale 
Please indicate the extent (from 1=not at all to 8=extremely) to which you agree with 
each of these statements 
1. Marriage between Jews and Muslims does not do good to either. 
2. There is a secret Jewish conspiracy. 
3. The Holocaust is often exaggerated by Jews. 
4. Jews are often accused of ridiculous things. 
5. It is better to have nothing to do with Jews. 
6. Iranian Jews suffered as much as others in Iran. 
7. Jews threaten the survival of Muslims. 
8. Muslims are better than Jews. 
9. Jews threaten the competence and control of Muslims in the world. 
10. It makes sense for Muslims to dislike Jews. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Anti-Zionism Scale 
Please indicate the extent (from 1=not at all to 8=extremely) to which you agree with 
each of these statements 
1. The Arabs have been terrorized by Israel for decades. 
2. The Jews do not deserve a homeland in Israel. 
3. The Israelis have the right to fight against Palestinian terrorism using any 
means necessary. 
4. Israeli incursions into the West Bank and Gaza are necessary to preserve 
Israeli security. 
5. Palestinian attacks on Israel are justified. 
6. Israel has attempted to forcibly expel the Palestinians for years. 
7. Many Israelis, or their ancestors, were forcibly expelled from Arab countries 
in 1948. 
8. Israel threatens the survival of Iran. 
9. Iran is better than Israel. 
10. Israel threatens Iran’s competence and control in the world. 
11. It makes sense for Iranians to dislike Israel. 
 
Appendix 3 
Identity Threat Scale 
Please indicate the extent (from 1=not at all to 8=extremely) to which each of these 
statements is true of you in general. 
1. I feel that my past, present and future are connected. 
2. My life seems meaningful. 
3. I feel that I have competence and control over my life. 
4. I am accepted and included by people who matter to me. 
5. I feel unique and distinctive. 
6. I feel good about myself. 
7. I feel that my sense of self is coherent. 
 
 
